JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. longer provides a unifying symbol of nationhood, and is being challenged on many different fronts, not least from within. Notable among these are the Protestant evangelical churches that have spread rapidly all over the region, and are particularly prominent in Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, El Salvador and Chile, among others. At first glance, these two social phenomena seem to be entirely distinct, and have generally been treated as such. Whereas indigenous nationalism may seem to fall naturally under the rubric of 'new' social movements or within the rapidly-expanding literature on new nationalisms, the study of evangelical Protestantism has been assigned to an entirely different realm.4 Indeed, whereas Christian Base Communities and liberation theology are sometimes examined in terms of new social movements,5 the evangelicals are generally seen as being antithetical to the idea of a social movement, since they are widely considered to be politically conservative. It is not, however, a basic criterion of social movements that they be progressive and left-wing.6 'New' social movements are characterised by their departure from class-based politics and a tendency to be more narrowly focused. Evangelical Protestant groups are not consciously organised around a political goal, but they do mobilise a large number of people around a particular end, and have as their goal a radical change of society.
relationship not only co-exist with but also depend upon more 'traditional' economic and social structures.17 Others have noted that indian identity can only be seen as a product of an historical relationship with metropolitan Bolivian culture,18 which, in turn, is produced through its contrastive relationship with 'the indian'.l1 In all these and myriad betweenness' is precisely what is rejected; and not only is difference constructed as being rather more than stylistic but is rooted in the unfashionable essentialisms of nation, race, ethnicity and religion.26 What is worthy of note here is not that one can find forms of hybridity, which is in any case to be expected, but that certain historical forms of hybridity are being rejected.
There are also those highland indians who are less 'deterritorialised', with cohesive and functioning communities that continue to organise on a 'traditional' basis. These groups, however, are much less concerned with defining clearly a national identity or religious orthodoxy. The apparent paradox is that in the northern highlands it is those who might be termed 'traditionalists' who continue to feel most comfortable with synthetic religious practices, assimilationist cultural ideologies and whose sense of identity is founded on relative and shifting categories;27 it is amongst those who are at the forefront of modernisation that we find groups who denounce syncretism, reject cultural (and racial) mestizaje, and hold true to essentialist categories of identity.
It is in the metropolitan areas of the northern highlands of Bolivia where the most clearly-articulated rejection of standard forms of hybridity is to be found. The northern highlights of the department of La Paz is, in Bolivian terms, a densely-populated area and includes the capital city. The population is predominantly rural and largely Aymara-speaking. Even the capital city includes several hundred thousand Aymara-speakers. The region also includes the ruins of the capital of the Tiwanaku civilisation, which is now seen by many as the original site of the Aymara nation.28 This area holds over a third of Bolivia's Protestants and it is also the area where indigenous nationalism has the largest number of supporters.
Obviously, such nationalism is concentrated among indian groups, but so too is Protestantism.
How then to account for the rise of these kinds of movements in the northern highlands in recent years? It is quite common to see both as having something to do with (post)modernity and changing economic 26 See Jean Franco, 'Globalization and the Crisis of the Popular'. In this they may be considered to be two more examples around the world of 'new' nationalisms and fundamentalist religions. Whereas it is perhaps more common for fundamental religion and resurgent nationalism to be closely allied in examples from the USA, India, Iran, Pakistan, etc., in Bolivia the 'new' nationalism of the kataristas and the fundamentalism of the evangelistas share a mutual antipathy. 27 Andrew Canessa, 'Procreation, Personhood and Ethnic Difference in Highland Bolivia', Ethnos, vol. 63, no. 2 (I998), pp. 227-47. 28 There is, however, no indication that Tiwanaku was anything like an Aymara nation although it is quite likely that at least some of its residents spoke Aymara. There is also considerable evidence that they may also have spoken Pukina and, in any case, Tiwanaku had important cultural links with Wari which is now situated in Peru. 
Katarismo
The 1952 Revolution is a major landmark in modern Bolivian history.
Despite providing the clearest expression of the homogenous nation-state under an ideology of mestigaje, it opened up the political space for indians to organise around a coherent identity. Resentment against the state and the status of metropolitan cultural ideology grew as it became apparent to indians that they continued to be marginalised and co-opted at best. By the 1990S indian groups had managed, at quite a profound level, to change the cultural ideology of the state, and to open up a more public space for their concerns qua indians to be aired. In 1952 the land-owning oligarchy of Bolivia was overthrown in a revolution, and in the following year the revolutionary government, often under pressure, enacted a series of reforms which had far-reaching consequences. The Agrarian Reform of 1953, under the motto 'land to those who work it' returned land to the peasantry and ended the hegemony of the hacienda-owners. Schools were built in virtually every village over the next twenty years. Unable to eke a living off the land, many indians took advantage of their new freedom to travel, and migrated in their tens of thousands to the capital city of La Paz. The spread of education and improved communications meant that populations which were previously illiterate and monolingual were exposed to a very different way of life, one that was preached over the radio and in the schools in the middle of their villages. The principal aim behind these schools was quite explicitly to create new Bolivians, and to create a new homogenous national identity. In many communities, the chapel or church maintained by the hacendado fell into disuse and to some extent the school replaced it. Where the church had been the means through which indians were integrated into colonial and national culture, the school would now turn indians into Bolivians through the agency of the schoolteacher.
In this context, the word indio (indian) was legally prohibited and replaced in most contexts by campesino (peasant), with the aim of obliterating any kind of ethnic and racial difference between Bolivians: it was the role of schools to turn indians into mestizos. Thus, as was the case with the Mexican Revolution,34 Bolivian nationalist ideology exalted a mestizo identity at the expense of an indian one. The new state needed the rural masses to lend it legitimacy while, at the same time, it felt the need to eradicate the retarding cultural elements of an anachronistic indian population.35 Thus indians, to borrow a phrase from Martin Barbero, were subject to an 'abstract inclusion but a concrete exclusion',36 all the more so since they were no longer supposed to exist, and now only received recognition for their colourful folklore.
A distinct indian identity and culture was actively suppressed during this period but, at the same time, it was in the post-revolutionary period that Aymara nationalism had its roots. The revolution opened up political By the mid-seventies, the hundreds and thousands of indians who had been drawn into metropolitan culture were becoming increasingly aware 35 It should be noted, however, that not all katarista groups are equally anti-Christian, in particular not those who seek success in mass electoral politics. 45 Bartolina Sisa, his companion and leader of the army, continued the struggle until she, too, was captured the following September, when she was hanged and quartered. 46 In Peru the parallel phenomenon is that of 'Inkarri', the Inka king. Inkarri's body is also believed to be growing underground or hiding in the jungle waiting for his It is important to note that the definition of'nation', used here is not that in the sense of Gellner51 or Anderson52, who see it specifically in terms of the nation-state, but rather more broadly as the political action of a group which recognises itself as ethnically distinct. It is not necessary for this kind of nationalism to argue for a separate nation state. Whereas 47 Pacha in Aymara is a highly evocative term and there is no room here to go into it in great detail but pacha is also the site of the tellurian deities to whom much indigenous ritual is directed. The pachakuti then is also the elevation of the indigenous nature gods to a position of hegemony as opposed to the domination by the sky gods of God the Father, Jesus and so on. 48 The kataristas of the CSUTB, in regarding the peasantry not only as a class but also as an ethnic group, were strongly critical of some of the tenets of the 19 5 2 Revolution. They were able to give political expression to the wide feeling or frustration and resentment in rural areas born of decades of manipulation and co-option by party and state.55 At the same time, they were keen to maintain the syndicalist structure of peasant organisation even while they attempted to make it more representative of and responsive to the ethnic reality of its members.
If Indigenous movements, however, are not the only challenge to the homogenous mestizo nation-state. For five centuries, religion has been used to conquer, incorporate and unify a disparate society and nation. Catholicism, however perfunctorily practised, united all Bolivians in Christian civilisation, even as some were deemed more 'civilised' than others. Catholicism's cosmopolitanism, in that for centuries it attempted to assimilate local cultural practices into its own,67 is concordant with the ideology of mestigaje which attempted to assimilate indians into the nation. Both had as their goal a model of Western civilisation, if not quite the same model, and both sought to achieve this goal by absorption. Whereas katarismo has undermined the homogenising effects of ideological mestiZaje, evangelismo has undermined the homogenising efforts of established Catholicism.
Evangelismo
The growth of evangelismo, evangelical Protestantism, also needs to be understood in terms of the cultural and economic landscape of postrevolutionary Bolivia. Institutional Catholicism was tightly bound to the hacienda system, and when the Agrarian Reform effectively abolished the hacienda system, the power of the Catholic Church concomitantly declined in rural areas. At the same time, rapid urbanisation and economic change put new pressures on rural people and migrants; pressures, it seems, that evangelical groups understood far better than their Catholic counterparts. These are the same pressures -of rapid change, dislocation and indeed racism-that produced the passion behind katarismo. However, in evangelismo, these pressures found a quite different resolution. During the 95 os and 6os, at the time that the Protestants were offering indians education and new forms of community and spiritual life, the Catholic Church was facing an important crisis from which it has arguably never recovered. The rise of Protestantism must be seen in the context of the decline in power and influence of the Catholic Church. Since the Conquest, the Catholic Church has been highly successful in allying itself with the state, and indeed acting almost as an organ of the state. Catholicism was not incidental to the Spanish conquest of America; it provided the moral justification.75 The Spaniards, moreover, were accustomed to seeing religion as a hegemonic tool since they had just finished a centuries-long war against the Muslims in Spain, the Reconquista, in which religion was used to justify the wars as well as providing a banner around which to rally support. Thus, when the Spanish arrived in the Andes, the politics of conquest and Catholicism had become inextricably linked and the concomitant subordination of religion to politics ensured that 'Catholicism in the Andes was to become first and foremost a mechanism of political and social control and only secondarily an ethical and spiritual teaching'.76 By the middle of the twentieth century the Catholic Church was still quite clearly a pillar of the establishment and supported the land-owning oligarchy. For example, one ageing mestizo resident of a small town bemoaned the fact that thirty years ago the priest 71 could rely on the police to ensure indians' attendance and contributions to religious fiestas whereas now attendance was voluntary. Similarly it was the hacienda-owner who brought the priest to visit the communities and obliged people to attend mass. Moreover, Catholicism was, and frequently is, seen as the natural religion of Bolivia.77
Even though Protestant groups have been active in Bolivia since the turn of the century -when the Catholic Church was disestablished -they made very modest gains in the first
The Catholic institutions supported the agrarian oligarchy against the Liberals and were resistant to change in the status quo. In the 1930S, for example, the Church angrily denounced liberal reforms that provided for modest education for indians on the grounds that they would be corrupted. At the same time, the priest could sometimes function as an intermediary between indian communities and the hacienda-owner.
On the other hand, despite being very politically conservative, the Church was rather relaxed when it came to imposing its orthodoxy on indians. Since the mid-seventeenth century, when it gave up its campaign known as the Extirpation of Idolatries, the Church had become quite tolerant of indigenous religious practice. So long as the formal language was Christian, non-orthodox practices such as animal sacrifice or the invocation of pagan deities were tolerated. This is a mark of the cosmopolitanism of the Catholic Church,78 but it is also perhaps a mark of the lack of engagement with its flock. This problem reflects the very small number of priests, and the even smaller number who spoke Aymara or Quechua, the native tongues of the majority of Bolivians until very recently.
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However, by the fifties and sixties the Catholic Church was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with its support of authoritarian elites. As the liberalisation in Europe and North America filtered through, the Catholic Church in Latin America turned its focus to the spiritual and practical needs of the masses, its 'preferential option for the poor'. In Bolivia, with the dismantling of the mining and agrarian oligarchy, the Catholic Church was unable as well as unwilling to fulfil the social role it had so successfully occupied for centuries. As it sided more and more with the poor and powerless it also progressively lost the political clout to deliver. In any case, by the 1970S many rural communities were rarely if ever visited by a priest,80 and so the Catholic Church had neither the personnel nor the resources to achieve its aims. In contrast, Protestant groups were able to send hundreds or perhaps even thousands of pastors into areas where there were but a couple of priests. While it takes at least seven years of higher education to make a Catholic priest, Protestant pastors frequently need little formal training beyond being able to read the bible. Whereas Catholic priests were few and often foreign-born, these pastors and missionaries were much more frequently from the same social and cultural background as those they were attempting to convert and, at a time when traditional social and economic structures were changing rapidly, they were better able to provide spiritual succour and new forms of community life. In particular, evangelical pastors found their message was received best among those people whose lives were changing most dramatically as metropolitan life impinged more and more on them, often finding themselves caught between a 'traditional' culture and a dynamic Western one.
Over 83 The first hair-cutting, rutucha, is an important ritual undertaken when a child is about 8 months to two years old. It is attended by the entire community, who welcome the child as a member. real, will spend considerable amounts of their money and agricultural products and, as a consequence, the cargo system serves to distribute resources from the wealthier to the poorer members of the community, since it is the wealthier people who are chosen as sponsors. Evangelistas reject all these offices and rituals as pagan,84 and it can be seen how being an evangelista in such a community would mean removing oneself from a wide range of social ties. Bernardo Guerrero has documented the manner in which Aymara communities in northern Chile are riven with strife as they go through the process of conversion to Protestantism.85 It is quite clear that a mixed community is a virtual impossibility for any length of time in these small rural settlements.86
In this context it is important to note that it is the churches of what can be described as the third Protestant reformation that are by far the most numerous.87 It is not the older churches of the first reformation, the Anglican, Lutheran or Presbyterian churches that were able to exploit the disestablishment of the Catholic church; nor was it the Baptists and the Methodists (although they have had greater success than the churches of the first reformation); but the churches which by and large were founded in the United States in the last century, churches which can be described as spiritualist, fundamentalist and frequently ecstatic. The association of evangelismo with a more advanced civilisation is evident in other areas too. Turco is a small expanding and ambitious town of the highlands which has been studied by Pauwels for many years. He found that the people recognise, both implicitly and explicitly, the incompatibility between the customs of old which were richer, more powerful and efficacious with regard to rain and fertility than those of today, and a desire for 'progress'. This is expressed in a nostalgia for the past and a feeling that 'we are finally becoming civilised'.104 Turco is exactly the kind of town where one would most expect to find the tension produced by change, and his insight that they are on a fundamental level incompatible is correct. His analysis cannot, however, explain why katarismo and evangelismo are strong and weak in the same areas. More research needs to be done in this regard but, as argued above, both movements offer complementary but radically different solutions to the same set of social and existential problems. They are complementary in the sense that they share a perspective on what they see as the current social and economic malaise of (in particular) indian people: they are radically different in that their solutions are diametrically opposed. What the data appear to indicate is that, given a situation where the religious and social status quo is being challenged, it is very difficult to predict which side people will take in rejecting it. Clearly, more work needs to be done on why a particular actor may choose one over the other. Interestingly enough, some of the founder members of the EGTK who targeted Mormons in their attacks were themselves once Mormons.112 There are other prominent kataristas who were evangelistas in their youth, and would prefer this not be made public. This suggests that evangelismo and katarismo are seen as alternatives from actors' points of view. Since there are many more evangelistas than kataristas it appears that once the middle ground is rejected most people opt for the route that takes them to a higher status, on the side of Western modernity rather than its poor copy, a mongrelised mestizo state. For others, in contrast, it may well be that the prospect of rejecting wholesale all the fundamental elements of indian culture is more than they can bear, so they opt for a vision of the world which raises the status of that culture. This process, however, may be more dynamic than might be thought in that it is evidently the case that some evangelistas become kataristas and it may be that the sense of dignity that evangelismo gives many people is indeed at the roots of their 'conversion' to katarismo.ll3
What is much clearer, and important to recognise, is that both movements draw their greatest and most enthusiastic support from the same kinds of people: generally those with secondary and university education, and most frequently those who have either migrated to the city or have close connections with it. The freedom to travel and access to education are important benefits of the 1952 revolution, but it also exposed large numbers of people to the level of racial and social inequality in Bolivia, as well as providing the intellectual means to conceive of an alternative. This accounts for why it is the main public university of La Paz, the UMSA,114 as well as the small towns on the altiplano with good communications with the city, that are the great centres of katarista politics, rather than the remoter communities which more closely approximate the kind of cultural authenticity the kataristas are seeking.
The similarities and contrasts between katarismo and evangelismo can be illustrated in the accompanying diagram. In some respects they are very Whereas the extent to which katarismo has changed public perceptions of how the nation is constituted is relatively clear, the impact of evangelical Protestantism in this regard is perhaps more muted but remains, nevertheless, significant. One of the curious things about evangelistas in Bolivia is that although they may not always be liked, they are widely respected as being honest, upstanding and industrious. Such indians may not behave in a stereotypical manner and may even possess a sense of moral superiority over their erstwhile 'betters'. But, perhaps more generally, the presence of a significant proportion of the population which adheres to a faith other than Roman Catholicism undermines the cohesion of a national religion even if most people practise that national religion in a somewhat perfunctory manner. The assumption that people will unite in national celebrations based on religious themes by dancing and drinking can no longer hold, since so many evangelistas absent themselves from these. As such, despite the fact that they are notoriously apolitical, evangelistas have an important political effect. They provide another example of the nation being made up of heterogenous elements, of how the ideal of the culturally and racially unified nation state is illusory.
In a region where hybridity has been a central feature of culture for centuries, the case of the northern highlands provides interesting examples of social movements which contest this hybridity and, moreover, do so quite explicitly. They provide a reminder that the globalisation of culture is resisted in often surprising ways.
